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Diversifying evolution of competitiveness
Sebastian A. Baldauf1,2, Leif Engqvist3 & Franz J. Weissing1
In many species, individuals express phenotypic characteristics that enhance their
competitiveness, that is, the ability to acquire resources in competition with others. More-
over, the degree of competitiveness varies considerably across individuals and in time. By
means of an evolutionary model, we provide an explanation for this ﬁnding. We make the
assumption that investment into competitiveness enhances the probability to acquire a
high-quality resource, but at the same time reduces the ability of exploiting acquired
resources with maximal efﬁciency. The model reveals that under a broad range of conditions
competitiveness either converges to a polymorphic state, where individuals differing in
competitive ability stably coexist, or is subject to perpetual transitions between periods of
high and low competitiveness. The dynamics becomes even more complex if females can
evolve preferences for (or against) competitive males. In extreme cases, such preferences can
even drive the population to extinction.
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C
ompetition is arguably the most important factor
structuring the living world. Ecological communities are
to a large extent shaped by competition among different
species, while intraspeciﬁc competition for ﬁtness-enhancing
resources is the driving force behind natural selection1. Here we
focus on competition among the individuals of a species,
addressing the question of how much individuals should invest
into increasing their competitiveness, that is, the ability to be
successful in competition with others.
There are many ways how organisms can enhance their
competitive ability. Trees produce high stems, thereby outshading
competing trees and offering their own leaves a place in the
sun2,3. In competitive environments, guppies (and many other
animals) invest in better sensory capabilities to locate food more
efﬁciently than their conspeciﬁcs4. Male bluegill sunﬁsh grow
large to be able to acquire and defend a breeding territory5. In
other species, individuals grow horns, antlers and other
armament for the same purpose6. Male sticklebacks develop a
red belly to deter other males and to attract females7. Virtually all
features enhancing competitive ability come at a cost. For
example, growing large or developing armament takes time and
energy that could otherwise be spent on other activities increasing
Darwinian ﬁtness. Moreover, there is often a trade-off between
being able to acquire many or high-quality resources and the
ability to make best use of these resources. For example, trees
allocating much energy into the production of a large stem
achieve a good position in the light gradient, but they can allocate
less energy into the production of leaves and hence are less able to
exploit this good position2. Sticklebacks with a red belly attract
many females and therefore have many eggs in their nest, but
they also attract predators8, reducing the survival probability of
these eggs. Red-legged male Zebra ﬁnches attain many extra-pair
copulations but invest less into paternal care, thus achieving a
lower reproductive success with their social mate9.
In view of these costs and trade-offs one might expect a single
optimal level of investment in competitiveness, at which the
beneﬁts of a higher competitive ability are balanced by the
associated costs. In contrast to this expectation, there is
compelling evidence from many organisms that members of the
same population differ considerably in the degree they allocate
energy and resources into enhancing their competitive ability.
Trees, for example, differ in their relative investment into stem
versus leaves; some trees outgrow their competitors by producing
a large stem, while others remain in shadow but make better use
of light of lower intensity2,3. Only a fraction of male bluegill
sunﬁsh grows large to become good competitors for territories;
the remainder stops growing early on and attains an alternative
mating strategy5. Similarly, a ‘pace-of-life syndrome’ is found in
many species: some individuals invest heavily into obtaining
favourable reproductive positions (for example, a high position in
a dominance hierarchy), while others consistently avoid risks and
seem to be content with a lower position10,11. In addition to such
coexistence of individuals differing in competitiveness, the overall
degree of competitiveness may also vary considerably in space
and time. For example, temporal cycles in aggressiveness
(associated with competitive ability) have been reported in
many rodent species12,13, while spatial waves of aggressiveness
have been observed in other species, for example, Western
bluebirds14. In side-blotched lizards, the relative abundance of
three male morphs differing in competitiveness exhibits both
variation in space and oscillations in time, with the high-
competitive orange morph predominating in some years and the
less-competitive yellow and blue morphs predominating in
others15.
To achieve a better understanding of these patterns, we
investigate a model that captures essential features of the
evolution of competitiveness. We assume that individuals
compete for a spectrum of resources varying in quality. Each
individual can allocate a fraction c of its energy into enhancing its
competitiveness. Individuals with higher competitiveness attain
on average higher-quality resources than individuals with lower
competitiveness. To incorporate the costs of competitiveness and
to address the fact that high-competitive individuals can often not
make maximal use of their resources, we assume that reproduc-
tive output of an individual is proportional to (1 c)R, where c is
the competitiveness of the individual and R is the quality of the
resource obtained by this individual. This formulation encapsu-
lates the basic trade-off between the ability to acquire resources (a
high value of c is associated with a high value of R) and the ability
to exploit the acquired resources (an individual with a lower value
of c extracts more ‘value’ out of a given resource R than an
individual with a higher value of c).
We ﬁrst consider a baseline scenario where the individuals of a
population compete for resources that are either of high or of low
quality. Individuals with higher competitiveness have a higher
probability to acquire a high-quality resource. Evolutionary
simulations reveal that the population will either evolve to a
polymorphic state (where individuals of low competitiveness
coexist with individuals of high competitiveness) or that the
population exhibits regular cycles between low and high
competitiveness. The evolutionary outcome depends on two
factors: the difference in resource quality and the extent to which
the acquisition of high-quality resources depends on stochastic
factors (in addition to competitiveness). These conclusions are
conﬁrmed and quantiﬁed in a mathematical analysis that is based
on an adaptive dynamics approach. The analysis reveals that,
interestingly, polymorphism does not arise by ‘evolutionary
branching’16, but in a more intricate manner. By means of
additional simulations, we show that the conclusions of our
highly simpliﬁed baseline model extend to other scenarios, such
as a continuous distribution of resource qualities.
We then expand the model by allowing the evolution of female
preferences for male competitiveness or, more indirectly, for the
quality of resources acquired by potential mates. With this
addition, the evolutionary dynamics becomes even more com-
plex. Preferences can also be polymorphic and subject to
perpetual change. Females often prefer highly competitive males
although less-competitive males provide more paternal care. Such
preferences can even drive the population to extinction.
Results
Evolutionary dynamics of competitiveness. We ﬁrst report on
individual-based evolutionary simulations for our baseline sce-
nario. The individuals of a population compete for a resource that
occurs in two qualities, Rlow and Rhigh. Each individual i is
characterized by an inherited competitiveness value ci that is
transmitted from parents to offspring subject to rare mutations.
Realized competitiveness is given by ciþ e, where e is a random
variable taking account of all kinds of stochastic factors affecting
success in resource competition. Individuals with above-average
realized competitiveness receive a resource of high quality
(Ri¼Rhigh), while the others receive a resource of low quality
(Ri¼Rlow). The number of offspring produced by individual i
is proportional to (1 ci)Ri. After reproduction, the parental
generation dies and is replaced by their offspring.
The simulations in Fig. 1 are representative for the evolu-
tionary outcome of this model. When the variation in resource
qualities is small (left panel), the system converges to a stable
polymorphism, where part of the population attains an
intermediate level of competitiveness while the remainder is not
competitive at all. When the variation in resource quality is large
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(right panel), we observe a strong temporal dynamics: when
competitiveness is low it gradually increases to very high levels;
but once such a high level is reached, competitiveness collapses to
a low level and the cycle starts again. The rapid turnover of
competitiveness strategies can be understood as follows. As long
as the population is monomorphic for one level of competitive-
ness, any mutation inducing a small increase in this level has a
large ﬁtness advantage (since mutants receive the high-quality
resource), leading to the spread of this mutation. This results in
an arm’s race to ever higher levels of competitiveness. The race is,
however, stopped when competitiveness reaches very high levels
and low-competitiveness mutants arise. In fact, a high degree of
competitiveness chigh is associated with a low value of (1 chigh),
implying that the resulting ﬁtness (1 chigh)R is small even if a
high-quality resource can be acquired (R¼Rhigh). A mutant with
competitiveness clow will only get access to a low-quality resource,
but still its ﬁtness (1 clow)Rlow can be considerably higher. As a
consequence, the mutants will spread and oust the resident
population.
Occasionally, similar cycles also occur in case of polymorphic
populations that are seemingly in equilibrium (Fig. 1, left panel).
Conversely, the population can remain polymorphic while
competitiveness cycles between very low and very high levels.
Examples for both outcomes will be discussed in Supplementary
Figs 1 and 2. These ﬁgures also illustrate that polymorphisms and
cycles in competitiveness are also obtained in diploid populations
and in case of a continuous spectrum of resources.
Analysis based on ﬁtness considerations. To get a better idea
under which circumstances polymorphism and cycles are to be
expected, we applied an adaptive dynamics analysis to our baseline
model (see Methods). To simplify the analysis, we assumed that
the stochastic term e is uniformly distributed over the interval
[ s, þ s]. As shown in the methods, the evolutionary outcome
strongly depends on three model parameters: the degree s to
which the acquisition of high-quality resources is determined by
chance, the average resource quality Rm¼ 12(RhighþRlow) and the
variation in resource quality D¼RmRlow.
If s4D/Rm, competitiveness does not get off the ground and
the population converges to c*¼ 0. Apparently, it does not pay to
invest in competitiveness if the outcome of competition is
strongly determined by stochastic effects or if the difference in
resource quality is very small. If soD/Rm, there is an intermediate
level of competitiveness 0oc*o1 that is evolutionarily stable and
convergence stable and, hence, an evolutionary attractor16,17. Yet,
if much is at stake (D is large) and competitive success is more
strongly dependent on competitiveness than on stochastic factors
(s is small), a monomorphic population with competitiveness c* is
not the end point of evolution. In fact, such a population can be
destabilized by the advent of mutants with low competitiveness
if soD RmDð Þ

R2m. If in addition s4(RmD)/(RmþD)2, the
population typically ends up in a dimorphic state where a high-
competitive genotype coexists with the non-competitive genotype
c¼ 0. Otherwise (if soD(RmD)/(RmþD)2), this dimorphism
gets destabilized as well, resulting in perpetual cycles in
competitiveness (see Supplementary Fig. 3B).
The parameter domains corresponding to the four qualitatively
different types of model behaviour are depicted in Supplementary
Fig. 4. Simulations incorporating the assumptions of the
mathematical analysis (that is, with a uniformly distributed
stochastic term e) fully conﬁrm the above conclusions (see
Supplementary Fig. 5).
Evolution of female preferences for competitive males. In many
organisms, males are more competitive than females. Males
compete for access to resources, while females are choosy with
whom to mate18. In situations where females directly beneﬁt from
the resources available to their mate (for example, if the mates
allocate these resources to paternal care), one would expect that
females make their choice of a mate in one way or the other
dependent on the quality of these resources. To model the
evolution of female preferences, we consider a population with
two sexes. Only males compete for resources, and competitiveness
c is only expressed in males. Female preferences are based on the
resource quality obtained by potential mates and characterized by
a heritable parameter p. Females with a positive value of p prefer
to mate with males having acquired above-average resources,
while females with a negative value prefer males with below-
average resources. The absolute value of p determines the strength
of the preference. In the Supplementary Material we also consider
the scenario where female preferences are not based on resource
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Figure 1 | Evolutionary dynamics of competitiveness. Individuals of high competitiveness have a higher chance of obtaining a high-quality resource, but
they cannot exploit the resource obtained with maximal efﬁciency. When variation in resource quality is small ((a); Rlow¼0.8, Rhigh¼ 1.2) the population is
dimorphic most of the time, consisting of individuals with low competitiveness and individuals with intermediate competitiveness. Turnovers between low
and intermediate competitiveness occur once in a while. When variation in resource quality is large ((b); Rlow¼0.2, Rhigh¼ 1.8) the population exhibits
regular cycles between low and high competitiveness.
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Figure 2 shows the effect of female choice in the case of small
(left panels) and large (right panels) variation in resource quality.
For the ﬁrst 1,000 generations, female preference p was kept ﬁxed
at p¼ 0, corresponding to random mating. Thereafter, p was free
to evolve. In the standard version of our model, female
preferences always evolve to high positive values. In other words,
females evolve a strong preference for above-average resources,
thereby enhancing the selection pressure on males to acquire such
resources. As a consequence, even in case of small variation in
resource quality (left panels) males are forced into competitive-
ness cycles, while in case of large variation male competitiveness
is driven to almost maximal levels. As shown in Supplementary
Figs 6–8, these conclusions not only apply to the standard version
of our model, but also to other distributions of resource qualities
and under other assumptions on the action of sexual selection
and on the inheritance of competitiveness and preferences. From
the perspective of individual selection, the evolution of prefer-
ences for high-quality resources is understandable, since, all other
things being equal, females proﬁt from such resources. From a
population perspective, however, this outcome is highly dis-
advantageous. In fact, competitive individuals ‘waste’ part of the
resources they acquire, and only a non-competitive population
makes maximal use of the resources available. Figure 3 illustrates
these negative implications of a race to ever higher levels of
competitiveness. Up to now, we kept population size constant,
implying that on average each pair of individuals produces two
surviving offspring, irrespective of whether these individuals
make prudent use of their resources or not. When the ecological
conditions are harsh, this assumption is not realistic. We
therefore modiﬁed the model by limiting the number of offspring
produced per female and assuming that the survival probability
per offspring is proportional to the amount of paternal care
provided by the female’s mate (which in turn is proportional to
(1 c)R). Now the population can decline if competitiveness is
too high and, accordingly, offspring survival is too low. Figure 3
shows the effects of the joint evolution of male competitiveness
(top panel) and female preferences (middle panel) on population
size. In the absence of female preferences (ﬁrst 1,000 generations),
the characteristic cycles in male competitiveness can lead to a
considerable decrease in population size in those periods where
competitiveness is particularly high. When females are in favour
of males with a low-quality resource (po0; generations 1,000 till
2,800), male competitiveness stays close to zero, no resources are
wasted and the population remains at its carrying capacity.
Eventually, however, females evolve preferences for high-quality
resources, thus fuelling the males’ race towards ever higher levels
of competitiveness. In the simulation shown, this results in
‘evolutionary suicide’19: population extinction caused by selection
where obtaining an individual ﬁtness advantage is associated with
a loss of productivity at the population level.
Fortunately, the implications of the evolution of competitive-
ness on population survival are not always as disastrous as Fig. 3









































Figure 2 | Joint evolution of male competitiveness and female
preferences based on male resources. After 1,000 generations of
evolution in the absence of female choice (p¼0, resulting in a dynamics as
in Fig. 1), female preferences are allowed to evolve. In the standard
version of the model, female always evolve a strong preference for males
with high-quality resources (p40), thereby favouring males of higher
competitiveness. In case of small variation in resource quality ((a); Rlow¼
0.8, Rhigh¼ 1.2) polymorphism gives way to large-amplitude cycles in male
competitiveness. In case of large variation ((b); Rlow¼0.2, Rhigh¼ 1.8)










































Figure 3 | Evolutionary suicide caused by the evolution of female
preferences for high-quality resources. In the ﬁrst 1,000 generations, male
competitiveness evolves in the absence of female preferences (p¼0) in a
scenario with large variation in resource quality (Rlow¼0.2, Rhigh¼ 1.8). In
contrast to the earlier simulations female productivity is limited (60 eggs
per female), resulting to a pronounced decline in population size when
male competitiveness gets too high (generations 580 and 780). From
generation 1,000 onwards, female preferences can evolve, starting from a
negative value (p¼  5). As long as preferences stay negative, male
competitiveness remains low, resulting in an ecologically favourable state
where no resources are wasted for competitiveness. However, female
preferences evolve to positive values; this induces the evolution of male
competitiveness to very high levels, eventually causing population
extinction.
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productivity per female is high, the effects on population size will
be much smaller. Figure 4 illustrates that the effects of the
evolution of competitiveness on population persistence are also
smaller in the diploid version of our model. Also in this case,
female preferences evolve on average to positive values, inducing
males to evolve higher levels of competitiveness (see
Supplementary Figs 9 and 10). Now, however, the female
population is polymorphic as well, with opposite preferences
coexisting in the same population. The fact that a fraction of
females has a preference for low-quality resources limits the race
towards higher levels of competitiveness, thus leading to a more
prudent use of resources at the population level.
Discussion
By means of a simple model, we have demonstrated that the
evolutionary dynamics of competitiveness can be surprisingly
complex. The model predicts both the coexistence of different
competitiveness strategies and the high temporal dynamics of
competitiveness observed in many organisms. In general, female
choice drives the evolution of male competitiveness to higher levels,
although highly competitive males waste part of their resources
and, therefore, provide less parental care or other direct ﬁtness
beneﬁts than could have provided with a lower investment in
competitiveness. The model shows that the race towards ever
higher levels of competitiveness, which is partly fuelled by female
preferences, can make a population very vulnerable and even lead
to population extinction. Our model also exempliﬁes that even in
competitive societies males of low competitiveness and females
with a preference for such males can stably persist: such individuals
tend to acquire lower-quality resources, but they compensate for
that by making more efﬁcient use of these resources. Last, but not
least, our model also suggests an explanation for spatial variation in
competitiveness: if the competitiveness cycles at different locations
run out of phase, the degree of competitiveness may differ
considerably between these locations.
Both in ecological and evolutionary theory the question of
competitive coexistence has received a lot of attention. In ecology,
the resource competition theory predicts that competing species
can stably coexist if they differ in resource consumption patterns
and their resource requirements20–22. The dynamics of resource
competition can be highly complex and lead to perpetual
oscillations or chaos22–26 and to spatial patterning of
communities27. Our model differs from ecological competition
models in at least two important ways. First, we consider
intraspeciﬁc competition rather than competition among species.
As a consequence, the competitors in our model (different
genotypes) are quite similar to each other, while most ecological
models presuppose that there are distinct differences between
competing species28. Second, the ecological resource competition
theory tends to focus on the ‘technologies’ to make the most
efﬁcient use of the available resources; if a better competitor
arises, more or different resources become available due to
improved technologies to locate, extract and consume resources,
and to turn resources into biomass production. In contrast, we
consider the situation where a higher competitive ability does not
make new resources available, but mainly leads to a more
favourable outcome in the distribution of a ﬁxed spectrum of
resources over organisms. For example, in the context of light
limitation we would think of the competition for achieving the
best spot in the light gradient29, rather than competition for
making the most efﬁcient use of light or for making use of those
parts of the light spectrum that are left unexploited by
competitors30.
Our model is in the tradition of (evolutionary) models of
interference competition, where individuals compete for access to
a limited number of high-quality breeding or feeding sites31–33.
Many models have been developed on the evolutionarily stable
strategy in such a competitive context34–40. The majority of these
models is based on a limited number of discrete strategies, while
our model considers a continuum of strategies. Our model is
more related to evolutionary games such as ‘war of
attrition’34,41,42, where the strategy space is also continuous and
where a small change in competitive effort can have a major effect
on competitive success. The new feature of our model is the
assumption that the costs of competitive effort are related to a
lowered ability to make best use of the acquired resources.
Typically, an adaptive dynamics approach16,17 is the method of
choice when analysing adaptive evolution in case of a continuum
of competitive strategies. Adaptive dynamics theory has shown
how polymorphism can emerge in such a scenario by
‘evolutionary branching’16,43. Different competitive strategies
can, for example, coexist if the resource utilization ability of
each strategy is narrower than the resource distribution44,45. In
our model, competitive coexistence and competitive cycling are
not caused by evolutionary branching. In fact, an adaptive
dynamics analysis not accompanied by a simulation study might
have concluded that the population would always converge to the
unique evolutionary attractor c*. Our study exempliﬁes that, as in
other models39,46,47, evolutionary branching is not the only
evolutionary route to polymorphism. Evolutionary branching is
based on the assumption that mutations have an inﬁnitesimal
phenotypic effect. In our simulations, mutational effect sizes are
drawn from a normal distribution with small s.d. As a
consequence, mutations typically have a small effect, but once
in a while mutations of larger effect do occur. As we have shown,
such mutations can destabilize the evolutionary attractor c* and
induce polymorphism or cycling. To speed up this process, we
occasionally allowed for mutations of somewhat larger effect size.
We do not consider this assumption unrealistic, since the limited
available evidence suggests that in natural populations mutational
distributions have fat tails, implying that mutations with larger
effect are not uncommon48,49. Moreover, even from a gradualist




















Figure 4 | Long-term evolution of female preferences. While female
preferences always increase in the haploid version of the model, they tend
to diversify in the diploid version (shown here). Over long periods of
time, three types of females coexist: females with a strong preference
(p41) for high-quality resources, females with a weaker preference
(0opo1) for such resources and females with a preference for low-quality
resources (po0).
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will regularly occur, since there are many ways how random
mutations can hamper the development of a complexly designed
phenotypic trait. If we may view the genotype c¼ 0 (zero
competitiveness) as such a loss-of-function mutation, just that
mutation would be most likely that most efﬁciently triggers the
evolution of polymorphism or cycling. We conclude that in
models with a continuum of strategies, evolutionary branching
should be viewed as a worst-case scenario for the emergence of
polymorphism and that other routes to the coexistence of
competitive strategies deserve serious consideration.
Methods
General assumptions. The individuals in our model compete for resources that
are essential for their reproduction. These resources differ in quality. In our
standard scenario, we consider the situation where there are two resource qualities
Rlow¼RmD and Rhigh¼RmþD occurring with equal probability. Hence, Rm is
the mean resource quality, while D quantiﬁes the variation in resource quality. Our
results do not change if all resource qualities are rescaled by dividing them by a
common factor (for example, by Rm). In all simulations, we therefore assume,
without loss of generality, that Rm¼ 1. The analysis of the situation that the
abundances of Rlow and Rhigh differ is beyond the scope of this paper. Analytical
results and extensive simulations (to be published elsewhere) suggest that all
outcomes reported here also apply to scenarios where the abundances of resource
qualities differ. The robustness of our conclusions is further supported by
Supplementary Figs 1 and 6–8, which consider the alternative scenario that
resource qualities are uniformly distributed over the interval [RmD, RmþD].
Each individual has a genetically determined degree of competitiveness c
(0rcr1). Individuals with high competitiveness tend to acquire resources of high
quality, but the allotment of resources to individuals is also affected by stochastic
effects. To model this, we assume that ‘realized’ competitiveness is given by
cr¼ cþ e, where e is a stochastic error term. In our standard scenario, 50%
individuals with highest realized competitiveness acquire resources of quality Rhigh
while the other 50% receive resources of quality Rlow. In the mathematical analysis,
we make the simplifying assumption that e is drawn from a uniform distribution





In the simulations, we make the more realistic assumption that e is normally
distributed with mean zero and s.d. se. Additional analyses and additional
simulations revealed that the distribution of the error term does not affect the main
conclusions of this study (see Supplementary Figures).
We assume that there is a trade-off between the ability to acquire high-quality
resources in competition with conspeciﬁcs (that is, competitiveness) and the ability
to exploit the acquired resources with maximal efﬁciency. If R denotes the resource
acquired by an individual with competitiveness c, then a fraction (1 c)R of this
resource can actually be utilized for the production of offspring.
Adaptive dynamics analysis. For the invasion analysis, we need to determine the
ﬁtness w(c, cˆ) of a rare mutant with competitiveness c in a resident population with
competitiveness cˆ. This is given by w c; c^ð Þ ¼ 1 cð Þ  R cj^cð Þ, where R c c^jð Þ is the
expected resource quality obtained by a c-individual in a cˆ-population. The
probability that a c-mutant obtains a high-quality resource equals the probability
that it has a higher realized competitiveness than the population average cˆ. Since
the realized competitiveness of the mutants is uniformly distributed over the
interval [c s, cþ s], this probability is 0 if cocˆ s, it is 1 if c4cˆþ s and it is
1
2þ 12s c c^ð Þ if c c^j jos. This implies that R c c^jð Þ is equal to Rlow if cocˆ s, equal to
Rhigh if c4cˆþ s and R c c^jð Þ ¼ Rm þ Ds c c^ð Þ if c c^j jos. Multiplying R c c^jð Þ with
(1 c) yields invasion ﬁtness. In particular, w c; c^ð Þ ¼ 1 cð Þ  Rm þ Ds c c^ð Þ
 
if
c c^j jos. The pairwise invasibility plots16,17 in Supplementary Fig. 3 are based on
this ﬁtness function.
We analyse the ﬁtness function by means of a standard adaptive dynamics
approach17. The selection gradient is given by @w=@cð Þjc¼c^¼ Rm þ Ds 1 c^ð Þ.
Equalizing this with zero yields the unique interior evolutionarily singular strategy
c*¼ 1Rms/D (which satisﬁes 0oc*o1 if soD/Rm). A straightforward calculation
shows that c* is evolutionarily stable and convergence stable and, hence, an
evolutionary attractor. In particular, evolutionary branching16 does not occur, and
polymorphism does not arise via the repeated invasion of mutations with
inﬁnitesimally small effect. However, as shown earlier in other models39,46,47,
evolutionary branching is not necessarily a prerequisite for the evolutionary
emergence of polymorphism. In the next section, we will sketch how
polymorphism arises in our model.
If s is sufﬁciently small or D is sufﬁciently large, the monomorphism c* is only
locally stable (see Supplementary Fig. 3B). In fact, a mutant with competitiveness
zero can invade a c*-population if w 0; cð Þ ¼ Rlow4R2ms=D ¼ w c; cð Þ or,
equivalently, if soD Rm Dð Þ

R2m. Although the advent of the genotype c¼ 0 can
lead to the collapse of the monomorphism c*, a population consisting of c¼ 0
individuals is not stable either. As illustrated by the pairwise invasibility plots in
Supplementary Fig. 3 (and the simulations in Supplementary Fig. 5), genotypes
with higher and higher competitiveness will get established by a sequence of
gene-substitution events. This process will, however, stop before the evolutionarily
stable and convergence-stable genotype c*¼ 1Rms/D is reached. In fact, a stable
dimorphism of the zero-competitive genotype c¼ 0 with a genotype of higher com-
petitiveness ch will get established if ch satisﬁes the condition D/Rmocho2D/Rhigh.
This can be seen as follows: a straightforward calculation shows that both
genotypes have the same ﬁtness if the frequency ph of ch in the dimorphic




or ~ph ¼ D 1 chð Þ= Rlowchð Þ.
These equilibrium frequencies satisfy 0o~p0o12o~pho1. Genotype ch has a higher
ﬁtness than c¼ 0 if, and only if, ~p0opho~ph. Hence, c¼ 0 will spread when rare in
the ch-population until a stable dimorphism of both genotypes is reached where the
frequency of ch is equal to ph ¼ ~ph. Notice that this dimorphism is stable without
satisfying the condition mutual invadability: while c¼ 0 will spread when rare in a
ch-population, the opposite is not the case (since ch has lower ﬁtness than c¼ 0 if
pho~p0 and, in particular, in a monomorphic c¼ 0 population). Accordingly, a
dimorphism will only appear after the previous establishment of a monomorphism
with ch4D/Rm via a sequence of gene-substitution events.
The establishment of a dimorphism of ch and c¼ 0 is not necessarily the end
point of evolution. On a longer-term perspective, the dimorphism can be
destabilized by the advent of a mutation ckach. The ﬁtness of such mutants is
wpoly ck ; chð Þ ¼ 1 chð Þ  Rh þ Ds ck  chð Þ
 
(as long as the mutant is rare), where
Rh ¼ 1 ~phRlowð Þ= 1 ~phð Þ is the average quality of resources acquired by
ch-individuals. A mutant will invade if wpoly(ck, ch)4wpoly(ch, ch). Invasibility can





Rh þ Ds 1 c^hð Þ. The result is that the dimorphism of c¼ 0 with ch ¼
1 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃRlows=D
p
is evolutionarily stable and convergence stable, that is, an
evolutionary attractor. In other words, if soD Rm Dð Þ

R2m, the system has (at
least) two locally stable attractors: a monomorphic population with
competitiveness c*¼ 1Rms/D and a dimorphic population where individuals






One restriction needs to be made: if ch42D

Rhigh (which happens if
soD Rm Dð Þ

Rm þDð Þ2), the frequency ph of high-competitive individuals in the
dimorphic equilibrium is smaller than 12. In that case, a fraction of the non-
competitive individuals will obtain the high-quality resource. As a consequence, the
genotype c¼ 0 will be invaded by mutants with a slightly higher competitiveness,
which obtain the high-quality resource at minimal cost. A situation such as this will
result in evolutionary cycles: a high-competitive monomorphic equilibrium can be
invaded by low-competitive mutants, but these mutants can in turn be invaded by
genotypes of higher competitive ability (see Supplementary Fig. 3B).
Individual-based simulations. The standard versions of our model are based on a
ﬁxed population size of N individuals (asexual reproduction) or N males and N
females (sexual reproduction). In all ﬁgures shown, N¼ 3,000. Generations are
discrete and non-overlapping. At the start of each generation, resources are
assigned to competing individuals as follows. First all individual i are assigned a
realized competitiveness value ciþ e by adding a randomly drawn number e to i’s
genetic competitiveness value ci. In our baseline model, all individuals with above-
average realized competitiveness receive a resource of quality Rhigh while the
other individuals receive a resource of quality Rlow. In the model variants with a
continuous distribution of resource qualities, N resources are drawn at random
from this distribution. The N individuals are ranked according to realized
competitiveness, and the N resources are ranked according to resource quality.
Each individual i receives that resource Ri which matches in rank individual i’s
competitiveness rank.
In case of asexual reproduction, each individual produces on average n(1 ci)Ri
offspring, where n is chosen large enough to ensure that the total number of
offspring produced is larger than N. Subsequently the parental population is
replaced by N new individuals that are drawn at random (without replacement)
from the offspring produced. In case of sexual reproduction, each female chooses
one mate as a parent for her offspring; each male can be chosen by several females.
Together a pair produces on average n(1 ci)Ri surviving offspring, where n is
chosen large enough to ensure that the total number of surviving offspring is larger
than 2N. Subsequently the parental population is replaced by N new males and N
new females that are drawn at random from the surviving offspring. (Our results
are not affected by deviations from a 1:1 sex ratio.) To ensure a constant population
size, clutch size n had to be adapted to the average value of (1 c)R in the
population. In contrast, n was kept ﬁxed in the ‘evolutionary suicide scenario’ of
Fig. 3, leading to a decline in population size when the average value of n(1 c)R
turned out to be smaller than two.
In the version of the model with two sexes females can exert mate choice based
on either the quality of the resource acquired by potential mates or by the
competitiveness of potential mates. In line with standard models of sexual
selection50, the direction and strength of female preference is characterized by a
heritable trait p. When preference is based on resource quality, the probability
of choosing a particular male as mate is given by the logistic expression
1þ exp  ap R Rþ dð Þð Þð Þ 1, where R is the quality of the resource acquired by
the male, R is the average resource quality, and a is a scaling factor that has no
effect on the direction of evolution. d is a stochastic error term (drawn from a
normal distribution with mean zero and s.d. sd) that takes account of the fact that
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females may not be able to judge a male’s resource quality with perfect accuracy.
The case p¼ 0 corresponds to random mating, since all males have the same
probability of being chosen. If p40 males with (perceived) above-average resources
have a higher probability of being chosen, while males with below-average
resources are preferred as mates if po0. When female preferences are based on
competitiveness, the probability that a male with competitiveness c is chosen as
mate is likewise given by 1þ exp  ap ccþ dð Þð Þð Þ 1, where c is the average
competitiveness in the population. In both scenarios, each female selects one male
as a mate and produces one clutch of n offspring. The survival probability of each
offspring is proportional to (1 c)R, where c and R are the competitiveness and the
quality of the acquired resource of the female’s mate, respectively.
The individuals of our model harbour two gene loci with inﬁnitely many alleles
per locus. The c-locus determines competitiveness and is only expressed in males.
The p-locus determines female preference and is only expressed in females. In the
haploid version of our model, each individual harbours one c-allele and one
p-allele. The values of these alleles correspond directly to the individual’s
competitiveness or preference. The haploid offspring genotype is determined by
independently drawing a c-allele and a p-allele from the alleles of its parents, where
paternal and maternal alleles are drawn with the same probability. In the diploid
version of the model, each individual harbours two alleles at each locus. We assume
that the alleles per locus have additive effects on the phenotype. In other words, the
phenotypic value of competitiveness and preference are given by the arithmetic
mean of the two allelic values at the corresponding locus. The offspring genotype is
determined in a standard Mendelian way: at each locus, one allele is randomly
chosen among the alleles of the mother, while the other allele is chosen among the
alleles of the father. The two loci are unlinked (corresponding to being located on
different chromosomes), because the allotment of alleles at one locus is
independent of the allotment at the other locus. All these assumptions reﬂect
standard assumptions of sexual selection theory; the implications of these
assumptions on the outcome of sexual selection is discussed in ref. 50.
After the offspring have received their alleles from their parents, a mutation can
occur with a small probability mc (resp. mp) per locus. In such a case, a randomly
chosen number u is added to the original allelic value, where the mutational step
size u is drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero. Most mutational steps
are drawn from a distribution with a small s.d. sc (resp. sp), but occasionally (with
probability pc resp. pp) mutational steps are drawn from a distribution with a larger
s.d. scþ (resp. spþ ) (see the Discussion section for a justiﬁcation).
We ran at least 50 simulations for each variant of the model and for each
parameter setting. Since the simulation outcomes were highly repeatable, we only
show a single representative simulation run per setting. The results reported here
are based on Rm¼ 1 and D¼ 0.2 (small resource variation) and D¼ 0.8 (large
resource variation), respectively. The scaling factor a was set to 2.5; any other value
would have led to identical results, up to a proportionate change in the scale of p.
The s.d. of the error terms e and d were set to se¼ sd¼ 0.01. Mutation rates were
relatively large (mc¼ mp¼ 0.01), but this was compensated by the fact that
mutational step sizes were typically rather small (sc¼ 0.01, sp¼ 0.5). Somewhat
larger mutational steps occurred with pc¼ pp¼ 0.1 and s.d. scþ ¼ 0.2, spþ ¼ 1.0.
To prevent too rapid evolution of female preferences in Figs 3 and 4, the
mutational step size at the preference locus were reduced to sp¼ 0.1 and
spþ ¼ 0.2 in Fig. 3 and to sp¼ 0.05 and spþ ¼ 0.1 in Fig. 4. All results reported
are robust with respect to a change in mutation rate and/or mutational step size.
Roughly speaking, the time scale of change is proportional to the mutation rate and
to the mutational variance (the square of the s.d. of distribution of step sizes).
Hence, reducing the mutation rate by a factor 2 retards the simulation by the same
factor, while reducing the s.d. of the step size distribution by a factor 2 reduces the
speed of evolution by a factor 4.
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